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THE 1967 PATENT LAW DEBATE-
FIRST-TO-INVENT VS. FIRST-TO-FILE
GEORGE E. FRosT *
United States patent law has traditionally been based on the propo-
sition that the first inventor, not the first person to file a patent
application, is the only person entitled to a patent. Nevertheless,
the President's Commission on the Patent System has proposed
that patent rights be awarded on a first-to-file basis, and this recom-
mendation is now embodied in bills before Congress. The author
urges that the conclusion that a pure first-to-file system would be
better'for the United States should not be too hastily drawn. He re-
veals that the present United States patent system is neither purely a
first-to-invent nor first-to-file system, but a hybrid system containing
many features of both that gives a great advantage to the first per-
son to file a patent application while also retaining important
aspects of a first-to-invent system.
N LATE 1966, the President's Commission on the Patent System
recommended a number of changes in the United States patent
law.1 Principal among these was the proposal that patent rights be
awarded to the first person to file a patent application. This is the
practice in almost all foreign countries. In contrast, current United
States law is based on the proposition that the first inventor, not the
first to file a patent application, is the only person entitled to a patent.
The proposal of the President's Commission is embodied in bills now
before the Congress 2 which were introduced at the request of the
President and have Administration support.$
THE Two BASIC PATENT SYSTEMS-FIRST-TO-INVENT AND
FIRST-TO-FILE
All important patent systems have been based on the filing of an
application for patent by the inventor or his assignee. Such applica-
tion must be in proper form and accompanied by the prescribed fee.
* B.S. 1940, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. 1945, George Washington Univer-
sity. Director, Patent Section, General Motors Corporation.
1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USE-
FUL ARTS (1966).
2S. 1691, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
3 H.R. Doc. No. 59, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. iii to v (1967).
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In some countries, such as France, a registration procedure is fol-
lowed: the applications are given a clerical review and then issued
as patent grants. In the examining countries, such as the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, and Japan, the applica-
tions are given some form of initial clerical review, a filing date is
assigned, and they are then put in line for examination. The exam-
ination process usually requires one to three or more years. In
each system there is the possibility of two or more patent applications
for the same invention-a possibility that occurs with sufficient fre-
quency to be important. In addition, there is the chance of a
patent application to subject matter which, at the time of the applica-
tion, was known to persons other than the patent applicant. Both
situations give rise to basic problems of patent administration-
determining, as between two or more rival claimants, who is entitled
to the patent and determining in infringement proceedings the extent
that knowledge of the invention by others before the patent applica-
tion in question was filed should be a defense.
Under the United States patent law, the defendant in an infringe-
ment suit has always been allowed to show that the patentee was not
the first inventor. However, the historical antecedents of the law, as
well as the 1790 United States Patent Act itself,4 developed without
any apparent consideration of the problem of resolving conflicts
between rival applicants. It remained for controversies that arose
in the administration of the 1790 Act to point clearly to the need
for some mechanism for handling this situation in the patent applica-
tion stage.5 The Patent Office interference practice, first specifically
delineated in the Patent Act of 1836,6 was devised to resolve this
problem. This practice, and the defense of prior invention in patent
infringement suits which generated it, remains a distinctive aspect
'Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.5 For the history of the Act see Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and
1790, Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFr. Soc'Y 243-88,
352-71 (1940). Section 5 of the 1790 Act provided for repeal of an issued patent upon
a showing that the "patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer." Section
6 of the Act provided that a defendant in an infringement suit could show that the
patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer. The 1790 Act also provided
in § 1 for a Patents Board, consisting of the Attorney General and the Secretaries
of State and War, to determine whether applications for patent should be granted.
The Board encountered a number of conflicting applications and is said to have made
determinations of which of the conflicting applications should issue. Federico, Operation
of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237 (1936).
' Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 120.
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of United States patent law. Similar requirements, however, are
imposed by the Philippines and Canada.7
The basic principle of Patent Office interference practice is that
the patent should go to the first inventor. This in turn derives from
the principle that the defendant in an infringement suit can show
that one other than the patentee is the first inventor, and thereby
secure a judgment of patent invalidity. As discussed hereafter, the
concept of "first inventor" is rather esoteric-some things that
logically might make one a first inventor are irrelevant and other
things that would seem logically unimportant are critical. But, apart
from the perplexities of the doctrine in detail, the grand design of
the United States patent law is to (1) resolve conflicting patent appli-
cations by determining who is the first inventor and (2) permit an
infringement suit defendant to show that one other than the patentee
is the first inventor.
Another way to determine which of two rival inventors is entitled
to a patent is by recourse to the patent application filing date. In the
most strict form of this system, the patent application filing date
is the sole determining factor. Actual acts of invention by the
patentee, or by others, are totally irrelevant. This system, usually
with some exceptions to the strict form, is utilized in all patent system
countries other than the United States, Canada, and the Philippines.
As a corollary to this mode of granting patents, the first-to-file systems
do not have the infringement suit defense that the patentee is not
the first inventor.
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST-TO-INVENT AND
FIRST-TO-FILE PATENT SYSTEMS
There are numerous practical pros and cons of first-to-invent and
first-to-file patent systems. The predominant advantage of a first-to-
file system is the availability and decisiveness of the filing date. The
date is a matter of record, readily established, and almost never sub-
Philippine patent statutes provide for the defense of prior invention in patent
infringement suits. Law of June 20, 1947, Concerning the Issuance of Patents, [19 4 7]
Laws and Resolutions of the Republic of the Philippines 153. Canadian patent law
also provides a defense of prior invention in infringement actions, but in Canada the
first person to conceive of the invention is deemed by the courts to be the "first in-
ventor.". See Christiani v. Rice, [1930] Can. S. Ct. 443, 456. The Canadian conflict
procedure is defined in Canadian Patent Office Rules 66-74. Decisions with regard to
priority are made upon the basis of affidavits that set forth disclosure of the invention,
drawings, and so forth.
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ject to controversy. The person entitled to the patent is thus readily
determined, the whole question of right to a patent vis4--vis other
inventors is quickly and easily ascertained, and no legal controversy
in patent application or in infringement proceedings is likely. In
addition, the first applicant to file has some claim of merit because
he has started formal steps to make the invention public.
The most basic advantage of a first-to-invent system is that it
awards patent rights to the person who best qualifies as first to create
the invention. As developed later in this paper, the "first inventor"
concept, as it has evolved in the United States, now means the first
person to perfect the invention to a point of demonstrable practi-
cality. A "reduction to practice," actual or constructive, is required.
Agility and speed in preparing and filing a patent application are not
essential. Ability, initiative, and success in conceiving and practi-
cally demonstrating the invention are sufficient.
It should be added that in Canada, the only other country that
has any form of significantly developed first-to-invent system, the first
"inventor" is really the first person to "conceive" or think of the
invention.8 The Canadian system can be supported on the ground
that it, too, awards the patent upon the basis of what is done rather
than speed in rushing into the Patent Office. The argument is
considerably weaker, however, than that applicable under the United
States reduction to practice test.
A number of additional considerations must be taken into account
in making a comparative evaluation of first-to-invent and first-to-file
patent systems. One is the "grace period" as to prior art. Every
patent system must rest upon a defined body of knowledge with
respect to which the presence or absence of an inventive contribution
is to be tested. This is the "prior art." Section 103 of the 1952
Patent Act,9 for example, demands that the patented subject matter
be unobvious in relation to the "prior art,"' 0 while section 102 of
the Act defines the components of the "prior art."'1  In the United
States system, the "prior art" consists of patents and publications in
' See note 7 supra.
9 Section 103 of the Act provides that "A patent may not be obtained though the
invention is not identically disclosed . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious... 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
20 United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966); Graham v. John Deere Co., 883 U.S. 1
(1966).
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
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any country either (1) before the invention date or (2) more than
one year before the patent application filing date. Patent applica-
tions filed in the United States prior to the invention date of an
applicant are also prior art.12 In addition, creations "known or
used" (that is, invented) by another in this country before the in-
vention date, or in "public use or on sale in this country" more than
one year before the patent application filing date are part of the prior
art.13 The patent systems of other countries incorporate somewhat
similar definitions of the prior art, with one exception. In most
countries, there is no general one year "grace period" allowance
between the date of prior art (e.g., a printed publication) and the
patent application filing date.14
The first-to-invent system lends itself to provision of a "grace
period," although it is workable without such a period.' 5 The "grace
period" is an important aspect of the United States patent law.
The United States law is comparatively strict as to what constitutes a
printed publication and what constitutes a public use.' 6 In addition,
the United States patent law, as it has developed, imposes require-
1235 U.S.C. § 102 (e) (1964), construed in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382
U.S. 252 (1965).
13 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) and (b). See generally Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1959).
"I For example, publication in Great Britian, or public use in Great Britain, prior
to the filing date is a bar to patent in Great Britain. Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14
Geo. 6, c. 87, § 32. In West Germany, publication anywhere or public use in West
Germany prior to the filing date or the "convention date" bars a patent, except when
derived directly from the the applicant and less than six months before the applica-
tion filing date. Germany, 53 PAT. & TRAE MARK REv. 151 (1955).1 15 In any patent system with a "grace period" some way must be provided to re-
solve the case where a patent application is filed within the "grace period" but after
some item of prior art. If, for example, a printed publication of an invention occurs
prior to the patent application filing date, the question arises of whether the patent is
justified. If the patent applicant in this case did not make the invention until after
the printed publication, there is little justification for granting him a patent, for he is
neither the first inventor nor the first person to make the invention publicly available.
One way to resolve this problem is to concentrate on making the invention publicly
available. In this case the system becomes a first-to-file system. Another way to resolve
this problem is to use first inventorship as the criterion in those instances where the
patent application is filed within the "grace period." This is the system now used in
the United States.
16 For example, under the United States law a public use may exist even though
the invention is used in a way that does not communicate the subject matter to the
public. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881). Also, secret use of an in-
vention for profit for more than the grace period is a patent invalidating abandonment
of the invention under the United States law. Metallizing Eng. Co. v. Kenyon Bearing
& Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946); Macbeth-
Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. 695 (6th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246
U.S. 659 (1918).
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ments of detailed patent disclosure and demonstrated utility far more
stringent than those of most foreign countries-a fact that accounts
for the relatively comprehensive United States patent documents as
compared to the rather sketchy documents used in foreign coun-
tries.17 There is room to debate whether the United States system
in this respect is the best course. Nevertheless, so long as the stringent
requirements of the United States practice are enforced, collecting
the data required for a United States patent application, and pre-
paring the application, will require considerable time. Correspond-
ingly there is a great prospect of a public use, publication, or other
item of prior art possibly resulting from the inventor's own efforts.
If patent applicants are to be subjected to such strict application
requirements, there is a strong case in favor of the "grace period."
The "grace period" in turn is made practically possible by the first-
to-invent principle.
Additional considerations, which weigh in favor of first-to-file, are
the problem of Patent Office interference proceedings, as well as the
less often mentioned problem of determining priority of invention
in litigation. It is not difficult to identify instances where the Patent
Office interference practice has led to very unfortunate results. The
classic examples are those of patents which have issued many years
late, yet with the 17-year statutory life, because of delays occasioned by
interferences. 8 When attention is directed to these, as well as to
17 The most dramatic example of the stringent standards applied under the United
States patent law is that of "utility" in chemical patent application matters. In most
countries a patent can be obtained with a mere statement that a chemical process has
some utility. This expression may be very vague, such as a utility in the preparation
of some chemical compound having "interesting properties." The United States law,
as applied by the Patent Office with court support, requires that there be an explicit
and specific statement as to the utility of a chemical process. In the recent case of
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals and upheld the Patent Office holding that a process for making
a new chemical compound is not patentable unless some use of the chemical com-
pound is set forth in the application and shown to be in existence. The Court re-
jected the argument that the new chemical compound (a close chemical relative of
a large number of biologically active steroids) had utility for research purposes. For
other decisions in this important field, see Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, 247 F.2d 800
(D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 955 (1958); In re Joly, 153 U.S.P.Q. 45, 243
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (especially dissenting opinions of Rich and Smith, JJ., narrowing the
Manson ruling); In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172
(C.C.P.A. 1960); In re Bremmer, 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950). See generally Note, 35
GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 809 (1967).
18 The classic instance of prolonged delay as a consequence of interference proceed-
ings occurred with patent 2,705,484. See Hearings on S. Res. 92 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1955).
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lesser but still troublesome interference aberrations, it is easy to
conclude that the interference practice ought to be abolished. This
is what the President's Commission concluded, 19 as well as the Royal
Commission in Canada. 20 The case in favor of this conclusion is
lessened, however, by the fact that only a small number of patent
applications become involved in interferences (an even smaller
number of applications are involved in interferences that go to testi-
mony),21 and by the general observation that reformation of the
interference practice, rather than its abolition, may resolve the
problem.
The third consideration, again pointing to first-to-file, is the
matter of international conformity. At the present time, all of the
examining patent offices are swamped with patent applications.
There is every prospect that the situation will become worse before
it gets better. Probably half or more of the total number of applica-
tions duplicate each other to some extent.22 As to these applications,
similar (but not the same) examination is made in two or more
countries. Thus, a duplication of patent office work results. The
argument can and is being made that the ultimate solution to this
problem should be an international patent system, involving one
examination and one issuance.2 Nationalistic considerations, as
10 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 5-6.
20 CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS,
PATENTS OF INVENTION 23-4 (1960).
21 Comprehensive intereference statistics appear in De Simone, Gambrell & Gareau,
Characteristics of Interference Practice, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 503 (1963). The statistics
are based on a 10% random sample of the 6,572 interferences declared in 1950 through
1959. The statistics show that the average number of interferences declared is about
0.9% of all patent applications. Id. at 516. About 87% of the interferences involve
two parties, about 11% involve three parties, and the balance have four or more parties.
Id. at 544. These data together indicate that about 2% of all patent applications and
patents become involved in interferences. Of the interferences that went through testi-
mony and a final judgment on priority, about 45% terminated in favor of the "junior"
party, that is, the second party to file. Id. at 521. About 20% of the sample inter-
ferences actually went to testimony and a final hearing on priority. Id. at 522.
22 Detailed statistics on the filing of patent applications throughout the world are
given in Historical Patent Statistics 1791-1961, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 89 (1964). The
total of all patent applications filed by non-nationals in the various countries is often
comparable to, and many times exceeds, the total of all patent applications filed by
nationals of the respective countries. Id. at 135-71. This indicates that at least half
of the patent examinations entail duplication. It is likely that the extent of the
duplication is even greater than the statistics suggest, because when a foreign applica-
tion is filed it is frequently filed in a plurality of countries, resulting in just that much
more duplication.
23 On May 31, 1967, the United International Bureaux for the Protection of In-
tellectual Property (BIRPI) released a draft of a proposed Patent Cooperation Treaty
designed to provide a greater degree of cooperation in the search activities of the
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well as economic and other differences between nations, make this a
theoretical and not a presently attainable goal. There is, never-
theless, much to be gained by conforming the patent systems to a
single arrangement so far as possible. Since first-to-invent is a dis-
tinctly United States patent system feature, it is a short step to
conclude that conversion to first-to-file ought to be made in the in-
terest of advancing international patent conformity. While there
seems to be no doubt that a potential gain exists in this connection,
the extent of actual benefit is debatable.2 4
A comparative evaluation of first-to-invent and first-to-file systems
such as the foregoing, based primarily on analytical considerations,
overlooks an important aspect of the choice in question-the extent
to which the present United States patent system is really a first-to-file
system. Actually, the present system provides a strong but rebuttable
presumption that an invention is made on the date the patent applica-
tion is filed. Numerous obstacles exist to proving an earlier in-
vention date. To present this phase of the law in its true dimensions
requires that the history of the United States first-to-invent system be
traced, and that the various qualifications on first-to-invent also be
examined. The balance of this paper is devoted to a treatment of
these subjects. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue either for
various patent offices. 839 OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 413 (1967). In
addition, the United States Patent Office and the West Germany Patent Office recently
completed an experimental exchange of patent search information. 838 OErICIAL
GAZETE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 1225 (1967). This exchange resulted in about 60% of
the prior art references supplied by each office to the other actually being used. Id. at
1226. The experiment involved 1,000 United States applications which were based on
an identified prior German application and 1,000 German applications based on an
identified United States application. Officials of the U.S. Patent Office concluded that
the average quality of examination results, as well as search efficiacy, was considerably
improved in these test applications. Id.
2  Neither the United States-German exchange experiment, nor the BIRPI proposal
(see note 23 supra) requires the use of a first-to-file system in the United States. How-
ever, the extent of the benefits of international cooperation depend in some measure
on the degree to which the respective patent systems are the same. There are a num-
ber of very important differences between the patent laws of the different countries,
however, that have nothing to do with first-to-file or first-to-invent systems. For
example, almost every country distinguishes between public use of an invention within
its territory and public use elsewhere. Patentable subject matter varies from country
to country, with some countries having designated classes of subject matter where no
patents are permitted (e.g., pharmaceuticals, contraceptives, etc.) and others having
judicially created exclusions from patentability (e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519
(1966), discussed in note 17 supra). For these and other reasons, the first-to-file vs.
first-to-invent choice is only one of a number of points of departure between the
respective patent systems.
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or against the first-to-file system. It may be observed, nevertheless,
that the law here discussed necessarily lessens the force of the con-
tention that a first-to-file patent system has great advantages for the
United States, but also lessens the case to be made agianst a first-to-file
approach.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST-TO-INVENT As
THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
In 1623, after resurgence of the Tudor monopolies under James I,
Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies. 25 This law was a
limitation on the power of the sovereign to issue monopolies, in-
cluding letters patent for inventions. The first section of the statute
stated the general rule that all monopolies are void. Among a large
number of exceptions to the general principle were two provisions
directed, respectively, to existing patents granted by Parliament and
to future patents for new inventions. Monopolies for new inventions
were authorized if to "the true and first inventor."2 6
The framers of the Statute of Monopolies probably intended only
to end the unhappy grant of Crown monopolies to existing products
and methods of manufacture-the cases where no technical contribu-
tion that could possibly support a grant was involved. The statute
reflects the statement of the Court of King's Bench in The Cloth-
workers of Ipswich.27 The court there held invalid a monopoly
grant to the clothworkers guild, but noted that "if a man hath
brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom
... or if a man hath made a new discovery of any thing, in such cases
the King ... in recompence of his costs and travail, may grant by
charter unto him [a patent] .... ,,28 Whatever the specific thoughts
in the minds of those who framed the Statute of Monopolies, the
expression "true and first inventor" has remained in the British
patent law. While this language now has largely been merged into
25 21 & 22 Jas. 1, c. 3 (1624).
21 Id. § 6. "True and first inventor" was an expression intended to distinguish
between monopoly grants for the manufacture, importation, and sale of salt, playing
cards, and other well-known and existing products that the prior grants had covered,
and patents for invention. For an account of the various monopoly grants by the
Crown, see PiucE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY (1913). Appendixes B-G are
lists of the various patents granted by about 1602. Most of these were to trades that
existed at the time of the grants.
27 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615).
2S Id. at 148.
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the prior art requirement, it is the ancestor of the language of the
United States law.29
The first United States patent act was passed in 1790.30 This act
differed importantly from the Statute of Monopolies. It provided
for the grant of a patent to anyone complying with the Act, rather
than authorizing a sovereign to grant patents as a matter of pleasure.
It nevertheless borrowed from the Statute of Monopolies in suggesting
that the patent could only go to the "first and true inventor or dis-
coverer."3' Since this language was used in defining patent infringe-
ment suit defenses, the effect was to make first inventorship a condi-
tion of patentability. This act, and subsequent patent acts, 32 led
to consideration by the United States courts of what one must do
to be the "first and true inventor or discoverer." The doctrine was
early enunciated to the effect that the first inventor is the first person
to "reduce to practice" the invention-that is, demonstrate its practi-
cal application. This principle was expressed in a classic Supreme
Court opinion in 1891 as follows:
It is evident that the invention was not completed until the con-
struction of the machine. A conception of the mind is not an
invention until represented in some physical form, and unsuccessful
experiments or projects, abandoned by the inventor, are equally
destitute of that character. These propositions have been so often
reiterated as to be elementary.33
" In Dollond's Case, Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P. 1795), it was held that
the patentee was the "true and first inventor" even though another had previously
made the invention and had actually used it without making it public. Under British
law, the defendant in an infringement suit can show that the invention "is not new
having regard to what was known or used before the priority date of the claim in tile
United Kingdom." Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 32 (1) (e). Thus, if
the prior invention is made public-as required to make it patent-invalidating under
Dollond's Case-it is also a part of the prior art under § 32 (1) (e), whether originating in
a prior inventor or from the patentee himself. The question of whether there is a
prior inventor thus becomes unimportant. Consideration of "true and first inventor"
under the British law is accordingly now concerned with questions such as the status
of one who has received a communication of the invention from abroad, employer-
employee relations, and the like. See TERRELL, PATFNrs 23-26 (1965). Mr. Justice Story
refused to follow Dollond's Case in Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435, 438 (No. 11,645)
(C.C. Mass. 1841).
80 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
8' Id. §§ 5, 6.
12The principal acts are: Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Act of July 4,
1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-293 (1964).
83 Clark Threat Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891). Prior
Supreme Court opinions expressing this thought include Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 516, 552 (1870), and Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1868).
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The 1790 Patent Act was superseded by the 1793 Act. 4 The most
important change of this act was abolition of the patent examination
procedure and substitution of a registration system. However, a
more enduring change was made with respect to the defense of prior
inventorship, which was reworded to provide, as a defense to a
patent infringement suit, that ". . . the thing, thus secured by patent,
was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use,
. .. or that [the patentee] ... had surreptitiously obtained a patent
for the discovery of another person. . .. "35
The registration system was abandoned, however, and the Patent
Office was established as an administrative agency, by the Patent Act
of 1836.36 This act also made an important change in ihe "prior
invention" defense of the 1793 Act. The language of the defense was
altered to provide an infringement suit defense when the patentee
"... surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for that which
was in fact invented or discovered by another, who was using reason-
able diligence in adapting and perfecting the same .... ,37 After the
1836 Act, the law remained essentially unchanged for over 100 years.
The net effect of these two statutory changes was to qualify-as to
infringement suit defenses-the doctrine that the first inventor was
the first to reduce to practice. In brief, if another "in fact invented
or discovered" and was "using reasonable diligence," he was treated
for infringement suit defense purposes as the first inventor. By its
plain language, the 1836 statute referred to diligence "in adapting
and perfecting" the invention, the equivalent to the reduction to
practice. It followed that the Act provided for a case where another
had done something less than reduce to practice and yet had "in fact
invented or discovered." This was construed to mean conception of
the invention. The reasonable diligence was construed to refer to
the acts involved in reducing the invention to practice.
These statutes led to the rather complex rule that has endured
to this day. In brief, under present United States patent law, the
The doctrine was first enunciated by Mr. Justice Story, while on circuit. See Washburn
v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312 (No. 17,214) (C.C. Mass. 1844); Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435
(No. 11,645) (C.C. Mass. 1841); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (No. 1,217) (C.C. Mass.
1817); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491 (No. 17,971) (C.C. Mass. 1813).
3'Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
3Id. §6.
30 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
37 Id. § 15.
rules for determining priority of invention for infringement suit
defense purposes are as follows: 38
1. One is not an inventor unless he has reduced the invention to
practice.
2. The first of two persons to reduce the invention to practice is
normally the first inventor.
3. In the exceptional situation where the second of two persons
to reduce to practice can trace diligence towards such" a reduction
from a time prior to the conception of his rival, the second to
reduce to practice (but necessarily the first to conceive the in-
vention) is regarded as the first inventor.
This formula is relatively complex, but it has a virtue not to be
ignored-it holds fast to the principle that the patent should be
awarded for what the alleged inventor has done, not his haste in
reaching the Patent Office. Thus, the activity of an inventor in
working towards a reduction to practice is somewhat privileged
activity that can be undertaken (if done diligently) without fear
that an intervening rival will obtain the right to a patent.
While the above rules evolved from statutes directed to the defense
of a patent infringement suit on the ground that another is the first
inventor, they have been applied, since at least the latter part of the
19th Century, to the question of priority of invention as between
rival patent applicants in Patent Office interference proceedings.
Beginning in 1952, however, the patent statutes have set forth the
reduction to practice, diligence, and conception criteria for both
interference and patent validity purposes.3 9
13 The development and effect of the rules relating to priority of invention is set
forth in the analytical opinion of Judge Colt in Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v.
Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288 (1st Cir. 1909). For a general discussion of the
present law and practice see Crews, Introduction to Interference Law and Practice, 46
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 755 (1964).
39 Section 102 (g) of the current Patent Act provides that: "A person shall be entitled
to a patent unless-...
"(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it. In determining priority
of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who
was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to the conception
by the other." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1964).
In addition § 282 (2) of the Act provides that "The following shall be defenses in
any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent...
"(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part
II of this title as a condition for patentability .... " 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2) (1964).
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THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID PATENT SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES
After the term "first inventor" had been equated with "first to
reduce to practice," a new dilemma emerged. The Patent Acts of
1790, 1793, and 1836 were clear in requiring that the patentee be the
first inventor. It was also clear, however, that the statutes did not
expressly require acts other than the filing of the patent application
to obtain a patent. This problem reached the courts at least by
1872 in Wheeler v. Clipper Mower and Reaper Company.40 It was
there argued in defense of a suit that the patentee had not reduced
the invention to practice before filing the patent. The court held
that the patent was valid and the proposition "wholly unsound." It
reasoned that the statute did not impose the condition of a reduc-
tion to practice and that the Commissioner and the courts could not
require proofs of a reduction to practice which were not required
by the statute.
It remained for the Telephone Cases4l to establish, beyond ques-
tion, the rule that the patent applicant need not reduce to practice.
That case concerned Bell patent 174,465 for the so-called harmonic
telegraph. This patent included, as Figure 7, a diagrammatic show-
ing of a telephone system, coupled with a rather short description
stating that the apparatus of Figure 7 would transmit vocal or other
sounds. All of this was sheer theory at the time. The apparatus had
not been constructed. No experiments that would directly lead to
any conclusion as to its workability had been made. It was not until
the actual litigation that the particular apparatus shown in the patent
was constructed. Happily for Bell, it then worked. The patent was
invalid, the opponents argued, because Bell had not constructed a
workable apparatus prior to the patent. The Supreme Court held
that the Bell patent was valid, whether or not Bell had in fact actually
reduced the invention to practice at the time of filing the application.
In the words of the Court:
It is quite true that when Bell applied for this patent he had never
actually transmitted telegraphically spoken words so that they
could be distinctly heard and understood at the receiving end of
his line, but in his specification he did describe accurately and with
admirable dearness his process, that is to say, the exact electrical
40 29 F. Cas. 881 (No. 17,493) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872).
,1 Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
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condition that must be created to accomplish his purpose, and he
also described, with sufficient precision to enable one of ordinary
skill in such matters to make it, a form of apparatus which, if used
in the way pointed out, would produce the required effect, receive
the words, and carry them to and deliver them at the appointed
place....
The law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to
get a patent for a process, must have succeeded in bringing his art
to the highest degree of perfection. It is enough if he describes
his method with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those
skilled in the matter to understand what the process is, and if he
points out some practicable way of putting it into operation.42
With a clear doctrine that one is not an inventor who has not
reduced the invention to practice-and with equally clear authority
that merely describing an invention is sufficient to support a patent-
it was a short step to resort to the equivalent of a common law fiction
as applied to the patent law. Thus the doctrine of the "constructive
reduction to practice" came into being. By the time of the Tele-
phone Cases, and ever since, it has been settled that filing an allow-
able patent application is a constructive reduction to practice, and
that such "constructive reduction to practice" is for all legal pur-
poses equivalent to an actual reduction to practice.
A related legal development has taken place with respect to the
status of a patent application as demonstrating prior inventorship
for purposes of defense in an infringement suit. The early holdings
that reduction to practice was required for an invention generally
occurred when defendants sought to prove prior invention as a
defense to an infringement suit.43 The Telephone Cases and sub-
sequent cases settled the doctrine that filing a patent application is a
constructive reduction to practice. The question then arose whether
the fact of filing provided complete proof of invention as of the
filing date for patent infringement defense purposes by a third party
unrelated to such application. The matter was settled by the
Milburn case,44 which held that the entire content of the disclosure
of a patent is deemed to have been invented at least as of the date
the patent application was filed.
"Id. at 535-36.
,
3 E.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870); Agawam Co. v. Jordan,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868).
"Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 890 (1926).
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The patent in the Milburn case was filed by one Whitford in
March, 1911. However, in 1912 a patent was issued to one Clifford
on a writing which described the invention claimed by Whitford.
The Clifford application was filed in January, 1911. Clifford
did not claim the subject matter asserted by Whitford. The de-
fendant argued that the earlier filed Clifford application showed that
someone had made the invention prior to January, 1911, that Whit-
ford had not attempted to show his own date of invention prior to
January, 1911, and that Whitford was thus not the first inventor. The
plaintiff insisted that Clifford's failure to claim the invention was
an abandonment, or at least an indication that Clifford was not the
inventor. In a typically short opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, the
Court sustained this contention. In brief, said the Court, "one
really must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a patent," 45
and "Clifford's disclosure made it impossible for Whitford to claim
the invention at a later date."46
The Milburn rule is now section 102 (e) of the Patent Act.47
The rule has been expanded by judicial decision to treat the dis-
closure of a copending patent application for essentially all purposes
like a printed publication-as prior art as to the date of invention.48
This is in sharp conflict with the idea that the first-to-invent feature
of the United States patent system centers on what is physically done
in making the invention. Indeed, since the disclosure and not the
claims of the patent application determine its effect as a reference
under the Milburn rule, we have a patent application treated broadly
as the equivalent of a reduction to practice. It may be argued that
this is going too far with the doctrine of constructive reduction to
practice. This seems to be precisely how the lower court viewed the
matter in the Milburn decision. 49 Despite such theorizing, however,
it is settled law that the constructive reduction to practice doctrine
15 Id. at 400.
48 Id. at 401.
17 Section 102 (e) of the Patent Act now provides that: "A person shall be entitled
to a patent unless- ...
"(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent .... 3 5 U.S.C. § 102 (e) (1964).
"8 See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
"9 See Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 297 F. 846 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
I F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1924), rev'd, 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
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applies to any United States application on which a patent issues for
all the subject matter it discloses, whether or not claimed.
The rule that a domestic patent application is a constructive
reduction to practice for all that it discloses is of cardinal importance.
Under this rule, by the single act of filing a patent application, the
inventor obtains the full benefit of the filing date as his date of in-
vention. 0 No other proofs are required to put him in the same
position as if he actually reduced the invention to practice on that
date. There are a variety of practical situations in which an early
filing date is of great advantage. For example, the combination of
an early filing date and an early conception date may, in relation to
a rival inventor, demonstrate prior invention on the basis of the
combination of first conception and first reduction to practice.
Another common case occurs when the patent application filing date
-though after the reduction to practice of a rival-is sufficiently early
to enable a showing of diligence running back from the filing date
to the conception date of the rival inventor.
The benefits of an early filing date are further enhanced by the
stringent standards of proof necessary to show invention prior to the
application filing date in interference proceedings or infringement
litigation. Conception, diligence, and actual reduction to practice
are not easy to prove. The date of conception is the date when there
is "the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act
[and].... all that remains to be accomplished in order to perfect the
act or instrument belongs to the department of construction, not
invention."5 1 It requires "the formation in the mind of the inventor,
of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in practice, that constitutes
an available conception, within the meaning of the patent law."'52
Diligence can be shown only when the inventor has concentrated
Iattention on the reduction to practice to the substantial exclusion of
work on other conceptions.5 An actual reduction to practice re-
quires not only a construction of an operable device, or performance
of the process, but also sufficient testing to satisfy a competent worker
50 See, e.g., Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 293
(Ist Cir. 1909).
s Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (1897).
52 Id. (italics in original).
53 Fageol v. Midboe, 56 F.2d 867 (C.C.P.A. 1932).
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in the field that the invention is ready for production. 54  In addi-
tion to these substantive requirements, the party seeking to prove a
date of invention prior to an application date must corroborate the
testimony of the alleged inventor at all significant points. The pro-
cedural requirement here is severe. As observed in one leading
decision:
All of the witnesses appear to be men of high character, and the
testimony of appellant, together with his notebook and time cards,
is very persuasive; but unless there be independent corroboration
of his testimony respecting actual reduction to practice, no award
of priority based upon such actual reduction may be made.55
These obstacles to proving a date of invention prior to patent
application filing date are of great practical importance. They
account for the record that most interferences are resolved in favor
of the party first to file, and for the general experience that the in-
fringement suit defense of prior invention, when successful, is
usually supported by documents or other strong proofs.56 In short,
although the law is clear that the defendant in an infringement suit,
or a party to an interference, can show invention prior to the patent
application filing date, the practical burden is quite heavy, making
the benefit of an early filing date very great indeed.
STRICT FIRST-TO-FILE PROVISIONS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW
Finally, we turn to a class of inventions where the United States is
now using a strict first-to-file system-inventions made in a foreign
country. The patent laws have contained a variety of provisions
respecting the issuance of patents to citizens only, to resident aliens,
and later to all persons.P7 The defense of prior invention has likewise
51 Payne v. Hurley, 71 F.2d 208 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
5 Kear v. Roder, 115 F.2d 810, 817 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
56 See De Simone, Gambrell & Gareau, supra note 21, at 517-91. For an illustration
of the detail required for a successful defense of prior inventorship see Corona Cord
Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
11 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Star. 109 (any person); Act of Feb. 21, 1793,
ch. 11, § I, I StaL 318 (citizens only); Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37 (certain
resident aliens); Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Star. 577 (resident aliens who have
declared intent to become citizens); Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Star. 117 (any
person, but with a fee discrimination against non-resident aliens, especially subjects of
Great Britain); Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 10, 12 Star. 246 (any person, and fee
discrimination against aliens abolished as to all countries not discriminating against
the United States); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198 (any person, with no
difference in fees for aliens under any circumstance).
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been varyingly expressed in the statutes, but without reference to
invention in a foreign country.58 However, in stating the require-
ments for obtaining a patent, the 1870 Act required that the in-
vention be not "known or used in this country before the invention
thereof" by the patentee. 9  Also, in 1903 the law was changed to
provide that under certain circumstances a United States application
should have the same effective filing date as an earlier-filed foreign
patent application.60 The statutes in this form were construed in
Electric Storage Battery Company v. Schimadzu.6 1 The Court there
held that a foreign inventor was not precluded from showing his
own foreign acts of invention prior to the effective patent application
date, even though this was somewhat inconsistent with the infringe-
ment defense as to prior invention in foreign countries. However,
Congress abolished the rule of the Schimadzu case in 1946,62 and
section 104 of the Patent Act now provides that:
In proceedings in the Patent Office and in the courts, an applicant
for a patent, or a patentee, may not establish a date of invention
by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with
respect thereto, in a foreign country ....
This rule is usually regarded as one of rather exceptional appli-
cability and not an alteration of the main thrust of the United
States patent law. But when we recall that 22,326 applications were
filed from foreign countries in 1965, and that this is approximately
25 per cent of the total number of applications, the figures can
11 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109: "[I]f it shall appear that the patentee
was not the first and true inventor or discoverer"; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat.
318: "the thing thus secured by patent was not originally discovered by the patentee, but
had been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed
discovery of the patentee, or that he had surreptitiously obtained a patent for the
discovery of another person"; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 857, § 15, 5 Stat. 117: "the patentee
was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of the thing patented, or of a sub-
stantial and material part thereof claimed as new, or that it had been described in
some public work anterior to the supposed discovery thereof by the patentee, or had
been in public use, or on sale, with the consent and allowance of the patentee before
his application for a patent, or that he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the
patent for that which was in fact invented or discovered by another, who was using
reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same."
1 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198 (emphasis added). The prior law,
set forth in the Act of July 4, 1826, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, omitted the qualification "in
this country."
10 Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1019, § 1, 32 Stat. 1225.
68307 U.S. 5 (1939).
"Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 910, § 9, 60 Stat. 940.
35 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
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hardly be dismissed as trivial.6 4 Thus, a very real segment of the
United States patent system is operating under section 104.
The striking thing about section 104 is that it provides a pure
first-to-file system. The inventor in a foreign country can gain no
benefit from an actual reduction to practice, or any other of the acts
that would go to making an invention date if they were done within
the United States. His only recourse is to file a patent application-
either abroad under the International Convention followed by a
timely United States application, or directly by a United States
application. 5
CONCLUSION
The above analysis does not exhaust the possible points of dis-
cussion on the extent the United States patent law reflects first-to-file
considerations. The illustrations and history discussed do, however,
show that the system cannot be accurately classified as either a first-
to-file or first-to-invent system. Rather, it is a dual system, using
first-to-file principles in some respects and first-to-invent principles
in other respects.
It can be argued that this conclusion supports those who would
change the United States patent system to a first-to-file system. At
least, existing experience with this hybrid approach, together with
the experience of nearly all foreign countries, shows that a first-to-file
patent system is a workable alternative.
But the further conclusion that a first-to-file system would be
better for the United States should not be too hastily drawn. Even
though our present system contains many first-to-file features and
gives a very great advantage to a person who files first, it retains at
least three important first-to-invent aspects. First, in appropriate cases
it is possible to prove a pre-filing date of invention and thereby secure
a valid patent notwithstanding the earlier-filed application of an-
other. This means that a domestic inventor can often take the time
required to perfect the invention before filing. Second, the system
provides a grace period as to the prior art. This period is generally
considered desirable and, in any event, makes practical the stringent
61 PAT. OFFICE ANN. REP. 26 (1966). The total number of patent applications filed
during fiscal 1965 was 89,234. Id. at 15.
65 For discussion of the International Convention see E. PENROSE, TnE ECONOMICS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 42 (1951).
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disclosure requirements unique to the United States patent system.
Thirdly, patent issuance on the basis of first-to-invent is entirely con-
sistent with the defense that the patentee was not the true and first
inventor. It seems plainly inequitable to permit a second inventor
to stop an earlier inventor from using his own prior invention-a
result that can occur under a first-to-file system. Our hybrid system
avoids this result, and yet provides many of the features of a first-
to-file patent system.
The 1967 patent law debate will continue. But the real issue
ought not be whether a strict first-to-invent system is better than
a first-to-file system. Rather, the issue should be whether our highly
qualified first-to-invent system makes possible benefits that outweigh
the desirable attributes of a pure first-to-file patent system.
